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Cases relied on by the State to support its position are 
inapplicable and distinguishable from the facts of this particular 
case. 
The introduction of the evidence of the prior sexual 
relations with Mr. Rivera was not so prejudicial that it should have 
been excluded. Rather, after balancing the interests, the prejudice 
that occurred to Mr. Williams by excluding the evidence requires 
reversing the convictions and remanding the case for a new trial. 
Mr. Williams was prejudiced by the interjection of his 
parole status into the proceedings, and his counsel did not waive 
the error by waiting until completion of her cross-examination to 




(Reply to Respondent's Point I.) 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW DEFENSE 
COUNSEL TO CROSS-EXAMINE MARIA GALICIA CONCERNING 
HER PRIOR SEXUAL ACTIVITY WHICH OCCURRED SAME DAY 
AS THE ALLEGED OFFENSE. 
The State responds to Mr. Williams' appeal by stating that 
sexual promiscuity is not linked to veracity (Brief of Respondent at 
18-19 (Citing State v. Lovato, 702 P.2d 101 (Utah 1985), and State 
v. Johns, 615 P.2d 1260, 1264 (Utah 1980)). Mr. Williams does not 
dispute this general proposition and conceded such in his opening 
brief (Brief of Appellant at 10 (also citing State v. Johns, 615 
-2 -
p.2d 1260 (Utah 1980)). However, in this case, Mr. Williams was not 
attempting to establish that the sexual promiscuity of Ms. Galicia 
showed that she would not tell the truth; rather, Mr. Williams 
wanted the jury to be aware that Ms. Galicia had been involved in a 
sexual encounter earlier in the evening. That encounter could 
account for the presence of semen in the anal cavity, and explained 
a motive for Ms. Galicia to not be truthful. It also established 
that Ms. Galicia had not been truthful about the existence of that 
prior encounter and offered a reason as to why Ms. Galicia might not 
be truthful about her encounter with Mr. Williams. The existence of 
the sexual encounter earlier in the evening and Ms. Galiciafs 
dishonesty in denying that such an encounter occurred fits within 
the exceptions set forth in State v. Johns. Those exceptions are 
discussed in Mr. Williams1 opening brief at Point I, sub-points A, 
B, and C and again here briefly in response to the State's answer. 
Reliance on State v. Lovato, 702 P.2d 101 (Utah 1985) is 
misplaced in the instant case because in Lovato, the prior sex act 
occurred two full days before the sexual encounter between the 
accused and the victim, and the defendant admitted all acts, 
contending they were consensual. Lovato, 702 P.2d at 105. In 
Lovato, evidence of the sexual encounter two days before was not 
necessary to explain the presence of semen since the defendant 
admitted having intercourse with the victim. Id. 
The present case is distinguished from Lovato since Mr. 
Williams denies anal intercourse (R. 814) and denies ejaculating 
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during the vaginal intercourse (R. 804, 493). A factual dispute 
therefore exists as to, at the very least, the sodomy count. In 
addition, Ms. Galicia's prior sexual encounter with Mr. Rivera did 
not occur two days before but only hours before the encounter with 
Mr. Williams. Hence, Ms. Galicia's prior sexual encounter is 
admissible to establish an alternative explanation as to the source 
of the semen. 
The State's second basis for contention in its brief is 
that the introduction of the prior sex act with Mr. Rivera would so 
prejudice Ms. Galicia that it should be suppressed (Brief of 
Respondent at 19, 23). Such a position is erroneous. Utah 
expressly rejected Rule 412 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (Rape 
Cases, Relevance of Victim's Past Behavior). The Advisory Committee 
note under Rule 412 of the Utah Rules of Evidence explains that the 
federal rule is poorly drafted and, more importantly, that the issue 
is better covered by rules 404 and 405 as discussed in State v. 
Howard, 544 P.2d 466 (Utah 1975). 
The Howard opinion points out that while the evil of 
"putting the victim on trial" is an issue which should be "minimized 
to whatever extent that can be done consistent with the process of 
justice," other countervailing considerations must be balanced. 
Howard, 544 P.2d at 469. In addition, the Court stated: 
[T]his accusation [rape; etc. . .] most always 
arises from an incident which occurs with only 
two parties present. It is one in which it is 
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easy to accuse,but hard to defend against. If 
the accused is convicted, the result can be not 
only a long prison term, with the resulting 
serious effects on a man's life, but the stigma 
always remains. Therefore, in serving the ends 
of justice and protecting the public interest 
it is important that the utmost care be 
exercised to protect not only the woman who 
claims to have been outraged, but also the man 
who is so accused. 
Id. Despite this admonition articulated in Howard, the trial judge 
suppressed the prior sexual encounter of Ms. Galicia in part because 
of what he considered to be an unwarranted invasion into her private 
life (R. 340). The balancing was incomplete, however, as the trial 
court neglected the prejudice to Mr. Williams. Mr. Williams faced 
multiple convictions which led to incarceration for periods of five 
years to life. By suppressing the prior act of sexual intercourse 
between Ms. Galicia and Mr. Rivera, the trial court forced the jury 
to exercise their discretion based on only part of the facts. The 
omission of these facts prejudiced Mr. Williams and may have altered 
the outcome because he was unable to present to the jury (a) that 
Ms. Galicia had a motive and opportunity to have behaved as Mr. 
Williams testified, (b) that Ms. Galicia's story had changed, and 
(c) that the presence of semen in the anal cavity could have been 
attributed to someone other than Mr. Williams.. Each of these 
sub-points was addressed in Mr. Williams' opening brief; Mr. 
Williams now replies to each sub-point of the State's answer. 
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A. THE EVIDENCE OP PRIOR SEXUAL ACTIVITY 
WAS ADMISSIBLE TO CORROBORATE MR. WILLIAMS' 
THEORY OF THE CASE AND TO REVEAL MS. GALICIA'S 
MOTIVES FOR THE ALLEGATIONS. 
(Reply to State's sub-point A) 
The State argues that Mr. Williams' ability to 
cross-examine Ms. Galicia concerning her route home was sufficient 
to support Mr. Williams' theory that the pair met on the street 
(Brief of Respondent at 19-20). This evidence alone, however, is 
not enough to support Mr. Williams' position. Without the evidence 
of who dropped Ms. Galicia off and why she was dropped off, Mr. 
Williams was unable to present her possible motives for approaching 
him. That evidence is critical to his case. Absent evidence of 
those motives, the little cross-examination that was allowed only 
damaged Mr. Williams case by allowing an inference that he spotted 
her and then followed her to her apartment rather than that she 
approached him and invited him home. 
Additionally, the State's suggestion that no evidence 
exists that Ms. Galicia felt scorned (Brief of Respondent at 20) is 
untrue. Although Ms. Galicia would not admit that she was dropped 
off at Mr. Rivera's request (R. 545-46, 589), Mr. Rivera chose the 
word "dumped" (R. 544-46, 588-89, 772). That choice of words and 
the circumstances allow for this inference to be more than just 
speculation as the State contends. In addition, Ms. Galicia did not 
run to the nearby apartment of her close friend, Mr. Rivera, for 
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assistance after the incident; instead, she went to a convenience 
store several blocks away. The jury should have been able to hear 
the evidence of the encounter between Ms. Galicia and Mr. Rivera and 
been allowed to determine whether the evidence supported a motive to 
not tell the truth. As a result of the suppression of evidence of 
the sexual encounter between Ms. Galicia and Mr. Rivera, Mr. 
Williams was denied the opportunity to present evidence on his 
behalf. 
Finally, the State asserts that Ms. Galicia's testimony was 
consistent and corroborated by the evidence (Brief of Respondent at 
23-24). Two important observations need to be made on this point. 
First, Ms. Galicia's testimony when compared with her earlier 
statements was not consistent at all. She first stated she had not 
had sex for a long time (R. 504, 549, 672) when, in fact, she had 
sex just hours earlier with Mr. Rivera. She also first indicated to 
the convenience store people that she had just been beaten, not 
raped (R. 440, 508, 576). (Other inconsistencies are laid out in 
the opening brief.) Hence, Ms Galicia was not truthful within the 
context of the instant case. 
Second, while the jury by its verdict found Ms. Galicia's 
testimony that she was raped to be truthful and supported by the 
evidence, the jury did so without the knowledge of these crucial 
inconsistencies in her story. The jury should have been able to 
hear all the evidence and then judge the case and decide based on 
all relevant information. Whether the State believes no logic 
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exists in Mr. Williams story is not the critical question. The 
question is how the jury reacts and sifts through the evidence. 
When the trial court suppressed the evidence surrounding Ms. 
Galicia's prior sexual activity with Mr. Rivera, the Court usurped 
the jury's duty and denied Mr. Williams his right to confront the 
witness against him. 
B. THE EVIDENCE OF PRIOR SEXUAL ACTIVITY WAS 
ADMISSIBLE TO IMPEACH THE CREDIBILITY OF 
MS. GALICIA. 
(Reply to State's Sub-point B) 
The State cites State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986), 
to support its proposition that under Rule 403, Utah Rules of 
Evidencef Ms. Galicia would have been too prejudiced by the 
introduction of the evidence of her prior sexual encounter with Mr. 
Rivera (Brief of Respondent at 26-27). Rammel, however, 
demonstrates the inappropriateness of the Statefs position and the 
court's reliance on Rule 403 to suppress that evidence. The 
evidence at issue in Rammel and examined under Rule 403 was evidence 
offered against the accused, not the complainant. It is the 
accused who suffers the greater chance of prejudice from evidence; 
only the accused suffers the chance of criminal conviction and 
imprisonment. The worst a complainant suffers is injury to 
reputation and/or intrusion into otherwise private matters. Yet, as 
indicated earlier, a balancing occurs in these types of cases where 
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the only two people who know what occurred are the participants. 
For a truly fair and accurate assessment of the case, the jury must 
have before it all relevant evidence. Anything short of that 
jeopardizes the integrity of the fact-finding process and ultimately 
the system itself. 
Rule 102 of the Utah Rules of Evidence indicates that the 
rules of evidence should be construed so that "truth may be 
ascertained and proceedings justly determined." Suppressing 
otherwise relevant evidence under Rule 403 on the facts in the 
instant case does not promote the ascertaining of truth. 
Suppressing the evidence of Ms. Galicia's prior sexual encounter 
with Mr. Rivera and her falsehoods concerning it improperly balanced 
the interests of the complainant over the interests of Mr. Williams 
who suffered a greater prejudice. Suppressing the evidence 
required the jury to make a decision without all the pertinent 
facts. Rule 403 and Rule 102 do not allow such a ruling, and the 
trial court erred in suppressing the evidence. In State v. Branch, 
743 P.2d 1187, 1190 (Utah 1987), this Court recently stated: 
Rule 403 is not to be used to allow the trial 
judge to substitute his assessment of the credibility 
of testimony for that of the jury by excluding 
testimony simply because he does not find it 
credible. 
The trial court used that impermissible basis (R. 339-40) and his 
ruling was thus in error. Mr. Williams should be granted a new and 
fair trial where all relevant evidence may reach the fact finder. 
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C. THE EVIDENCE OF PRIOR SEXUAL ACTIVITY WAS 
ADMISSIBLE AS AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION OF 
THE PRESENCE OF SEMINAL FLUID IN THE ANAL 
CAVITY. 
(Reply to State's Sub-point C) 
The State correctly recounts Dr. Stuart's testimony that no 
conclusive physical evidence existed as to anal intercourse (Brief 
of Respondent at 27. R. at 648). It is precisely because there was 
no conclusive evidence of anal intercourse that evidence of Mr. 
Rivera's sexual participation with Ms. Galicia is relevant. The 
anal smear revealed the presence of sperm (R. 558) which Dr. Stuart 
testified could have drained or dripped from the vagina (R. 648). 
Both Mr. Williams and Mr. Rivera admitted vaginal intercourse and 
could have been the source of the seminal fluid. Mr. Rivera 
testified he had had a vasectomy; Mr. Williams testified he did not 
ejaculate. A material issue existed regarding the source of the 
semen. 
The jury was only allowed to hear that Mr. Williams had 
sexual intercourse with Ms. Galicia; they were not aware that a 
second party, Mr. Rivera, had been sexually involved with Ms. 
Galicia or that for some reason, she had lied about the other sexual 
activity. By suppressing such evidence, the trial court denied 
Mr.Williams a fair trial. 
The State confuses the issue of the relevance of Mr. 
Rivera's sexual relations with Ms. Galicia by claiming that as a 
secreter with the same blood system as Ms. Galicia, presence of his 
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seminal fluid would have been masked (Brief of Respondent at 28). 
While that statement is true, it is also misleading for two 
reasons. First, semen comes only from a male and cannot be masked. 
Second, Mr. Williams is a non-secreter and would not have left 
anything to mask had he ejaculated (R. 559-60). Neither man's semen 
was detectable yet one of the two deposited the sperm. The trial 
court's handling of the issue denied Mr. Williams a fair trial 
because the judge took from the jury the duty to determine which of 
the men was responsible for the deposit of semen. The evidence left 
that question open and it should have been resolved by the trier of 
fact - the jury - and not by the judge via a pretrial Motion to 
Suppress, or the State via argument in its brief. 
POINT II. 
(Reply to Respondent's Point II) 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DECLARE 
A MISTRIAL AFTER EVIDENCE OF MR. WILLIAMS' 
STATUS AS PAROLEE TWICE REACHED THE JURORS. 
While the opening brief of Mr. Williams thoroughly covers 
this issue, two brief points in response are appropriate. 
First, the State contends that defense counsel made a 
belated mistrial motion and thereby waived the claim of error that 
occurred when Ms.Galicia's son introduced evidence of Mr. Williams' 
parole status (Brief of Respondent at 33). The State's claim is 
without merit. 
Rule 103, Utah Rules of Evidence (1983) requires a "timely" 
objection or motion. To be "timely", an objection need not be 
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"simultaneous". Instead, it must be contemporaneously made, giving 
the trial court an opportunity to rule and, if possible, correct the 
error. 
In the present case, a review of the circumstances and 
subsequent explanation by defense counsel points out that the motion 
was contemporaneous and timely as required (R 690-700). Based on 
the trial court's earlier denial of a similar motion, defense 
counsel had reason to believe that the court was not inclined to 
grant a motion for mistrial on this ground. Defense counsel had 
good reason to avoid calling additional attention to the word 
"parole" by making a simultaneous objection and motion to strike. 
Furthermore, the prejudice would have been compounded rather than 
alleviated by an order from the court for the jurors to disregard 
what they had just heard. 
Second, the State suggests that if any error occurred, it 
was harmless (Brief of Respondent at 35). Such is not the case. 
The jury heard the word parole which unquestionably indicates prior 
convictions. Prior conviction evidence is presumed prejudicial, 
State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985). The jury very 
likely assumed the worse and attributed guilt by virtue of that 
additional piece of impermissible evidence. 
Furthermore, the State does not defend the prosecutor's 
failure to properly admonish witnesses. A pre-trial motion to 
suppress all prior conviction evidence was granted by the Court (R. 
331-41). The court repeatedly admonished the jurors to avoid 
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publicity likely to disclose that prejudicing information (R. 443/ 
578, 609) and the prosecution had been instructed to admonish 
witnesses to guard against prior conviction evidence reaching the 
jury (R. 710-13). With all the concern and care taken to keep out 
the evidence of prior convictions, it is inconsistent to find such 
evidence harmless and nonprejudicial when it reaches the jury. The 
Court should have recognized the prejudice it had taken pains to 
avoid, and granted the motion for a mistrial. 
POINT III. NO REPLY 
POINT IV. NO REPLY 
CONCLUSION 
For all or any of the foregoing reasons, as well as those 
articulated in the opening brief, Mr. Williams respectfully requests 
that this Court grant his appeal, reverse his convictions, and 
remand to the trial court for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this [^j day of August, 1988. 
/ ^ - ^ — 
KAREN STAM ' 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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